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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the ‘governance turn’ in the development policies of the European Union, 
represented in particular by the adoption of the ‘European Consensus on Development’ in 2005. The 
main assumption inherent in the EU approach to development is that the quality of governance in 
developing countries is a crucial (co-) determinant of development outcomes. The paper sets up an 
analysis of the allocation of funds (over €50 billion during the 2007-13 period) through the EU’s main 
policy instruments: the European Development Fund, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument, and the Development Cooperation Instrument. The paper attempts to establish whether 
any dominant explanation, or combination of explanations, given in the literature on development 
assistance, is able to account for the allocation of those parts of the funds that are meant to be spent on 
governance reform. Three sets of hypotheses are tested, each derived from one of the dominant 
explanatory models of development assistance: donor interest, recipient need and constructivist 
models. The findings of the empirical analyses emphasise the role of donor-interest variables, but 
show that recipient needs play a (seemingly subordinate) role in decisions on EU aid allocation. 
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1. Introduction 
Similar to most other providers of international development assistance, the European Union 
has been subject to the ‘governance turn’ of the late 1990s. Policy documents produced by the 
European Commission and Council around 2000 show a clear embrace of ideas on ‘good 
governance’ that had been produced by the World Bank in the final decade of the previous 
century. As such, the European Union supported the ‘Post-Washington Consensus’ that 
replaced the market fundamentalism of the previous era. 
 Good governance was seen, by the main EU institutions, as a fundamental principle of its 
development policy, in service of the main policy objective: ‘to reduce and, eventually, to 
eradicate poverty’ (European Council and Commission 2000: point 6). Good governance, 
alongside the protection of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, was accorded 
prime importance particularly to enhance the effectiveness of its poverty-reduction efforts. 
As it was phrased in a communication by the European Commission: 
 
Poverty reduction, the main objective of the European Community’s development policy, 
will only be sustainably achieved where there are functioning participatory democracies 
and accountable governments. Corrupt and autocratic governments are likely to misuse 
development assistance either to maintain repression or for private enrichment at the 
expense of their populations. (European Commission 2001b: 4) 
 
Possibly the broadest statement on the issue is given in the European Consensus on 
Development, a landmark document of EU development assistance policy that signalled 
agreement among member states and EU institutions on its basic principles (cf. Carbone 
2007: 55-6). The Consensus referred to the EU’s emphasis of the promotion of ‘common 
values’ in its policies towards third countries, which would be ‘respect for human rights, 
fundamental freedoms, peace, democracy, good governance, gender equality, the rule of law, 
solidarity and justice’ (European Parliament, Council and Commission 2006: C46/3). A more 
recent statement, issued at the launch of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 
January 2011, emphasised the continuity in EU thinking over the first decade of this century. 
At this occasion, David O’Sullivan (2011: 7), Chief Operating Officer of the newly established 
EEAS, indicated that the promotion of human rights and good governance would be ‘the 
silver thread running through everything we do’. 
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 Empirical research on aid allocation of the past ten years has consistently found that 
governance-related considerations exert limited to negligible influence on the actual 
selectivity of development assistance (e.g., Neumayer 2003, Hout 2007, Clist 2011). A study 
by Gordon Crawford, on so-called ‘political aid’ provided by the European Union, reported 
some impact of political selectivity, in particular with regard to the promotion of democracy. 
Crawford concluded: 
 
Clearly, the EU has provided substantial assistance to processes of democratic transition, 
but considerably less to subsequent democratic consolidation. … The EU has concentrated 
its support on promoting free and fair elections and on civil and political rights, with 
more limited assistance to promoting open and accountable government and to a 
democratic society. The neglect of promoting open and accountable government is 
particularly noticeable. (Crawford 2001: 150-1) 
 
 The purpose of this paper is to assess whether and to what extent the attention for the 
quality of governance among the central objectives of EU development policy has had any 
noticeable effect on the allocation of development assistance to the EU’s partner countries in 
Africa, Latin America, Asia and the so-called neighbourhood. On the basis of the most recent 
Country Strategy Papers (CSP), agreed by the European Commission for the 2008-13 period, 
the analysis attempts to establish the pattern of governance-related allocations in relation to 
some commonly held theories about the motivations of development assistance. This paper 
starts from the two most general interpretations, revolving around ‘recipient need’ and 
‘donor interest’ (see McKinlay and Little 1979 for an early discussion of the dichotomy), as 
these are the most common reference points in many studies on aid allocation. Next to these 
perspectives, the paper focuses on constructivist approaches to aid that emphasise the role of 
ideas and norms (cf. Carbone 2007, Van der Veen 2011). With regard to such perspectives, 
the paper distinguishes between a ‘liberal’ take to aid, which stresses the values of 
democracy and human rights, and a ‘radical’ one, which highlights the role of aid in 
deepening the neo-liberal agenda of market-oriented reform. 
 The paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses some salient aspects of the 
EU’s development policy and its focus on aspects of ‘good governance’. Section 3 outlines 
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the theoretical perspectives and formulates some hypotheses on the allocation of EU aid 
funds. Section 4 discusses the methodology and data used in the paper. Section 5 contains 
the analysis of allocations according to the recent CSPs. The final section formulates some 
conclusions on the allocation of EU development assistance and the debate about aid 
selectivity. 
 
 
2. EU Development Policy and ‘Good Governance’ 
Since the end of the Cold War, European Union development assistance policies have been 
targeting three main ‘arenas’: the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific (or ACP) countries; 
the European ‘neighbourhood’; and other developing countries. The first arena consists 
mainly of former colonies of the EU’s member states and has been regulated by a sequence of 
conventions and agreements, named after the African cities where these were concluded: 
Yaoundé (1964-1976), Lomé (1976-2003) and Cotonou (since 2003). Development assistance to 
the ACP group is financed from the European Development Fund (EDF), which contains 
€22.7 billion for the 2008-13 period and is currently in its tenth quinquennial round. The 
second arena includes countries in North Africa, the Mediterranean rim of the Middle East 
and countries that were part of the former Soviet Union and are west of the Ural Mountains 
and in the Caucasus. The financing instrument is the European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI), holding €11.2 billion for the 2007-13 period. The third arena 
is a more or less residual group, consisting of countries in Latin America, Asia and the 
Middle East, plus the Central Asian former Soviet republics and South Africa. Policies for 
this group are currently being financed from the Development Cooperation Instrument 
(DCI), which amounts to €16.9 billion, to be spent from 2007 until 2013. 
The aid relationship between the European Union and partner developing countries is 
structured by the so-called Country Strategy Paper (CSP). The CSP contains the EU’s 
medium-term strategy for the provision of development assistance on the basis of a country’s 
official national policy priorities. The latter have usually been laid down in a Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), required for support from the World Bank and IMF. The 
so-called Multiannual or National Indicative Programme (MIP/NIP) serves as a financial 
operationalisation of the CSP. 
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The legal-institutional framework of EU development cooperation changed considerably 
with the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2011. The establishment of the 
position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (who 
also serves as one of the vice-presidents of the European Commission), the creation of the 
European External Action Service and the merger of two separate Directorates-General into 
DG Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid (DEVCO in short) have been the most 
obvious changes in the area of development policy. The restructuring resulted, according to 
two analysts, in ‘a complex programming process’ (van Seters and Klavert 2011: 3). The 
European Council decided in July 2010 to reorganise policy-making responsibilities on 
development cooperation by making the EEAS responsible for preparing decision making in 
the Commission on country allocations, CSPs and MIPs (European Council 2010: article 9.3). 
Notwithstanding these responsibilities, the Commissioners for Development and 
Neighbourhood Policy have retained their powers, as ‘any proposals’ on the three 
development instruments that were mentioned above would need to be made jointly by the 
relevant departments of the EEAS and those of DG DEVCO  ‘under the responsibility of the 
Commissioner’ and ‘submitted jointly with the High Representative for adoption by the 
Commission’ (European Council 2010: articles 9.4 and 9.5). 
 Building on an earlier statement of the European Council and the Commission (2000), the 
first major steps toward including a governance dimension in EU development assistance 
were set in 2003. A communication drafted by the European Commission, as well as ensuing 
conclusions formulated by the European Council, stressed the centrality of proper 
governance arrangements to securing positive development outcomes. The Commission, 
which interpreted governance primarily in terms of rules and processes guiding interest 
articulation, resource management and the exercise of power, argued that ‘[the] way public 
functions are carried out, public resources are managed and public regulatory powers are 
exercised is the major issue to be addressed in that context. The real value of the concept of 
governance is that it provides a terminology that is more pragmatic than democracy, human 
rights, etc.’ (European Commission 2003: 3). The Commission and the Council agreed that 
good governance policies should not be ‘one-size-fits-all’, but rather recognised the 
distinction between ‘effective partnerships’ where conventional tools for governance reform 
would be feasible and ‘difficult partnerships and post-conflict situations’ (fragile states) that 
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necessitate the adoption of more targeted approaches (European Commission 2003: 18; 
European Council 2003b: 4). 
 In an attempt to operationalise the governance approach adopted by the Council and 
Commission, the EuropeAid Cooperation Office drafted a handbook on promoting good 
governance. The Handbook argued that ‘it is now recognised by all actors that governance, 
i.e. the state’s ability to serve the citizens, is a key component of policies and reforms for 
poverty reduction and that good governance is key to the sustainable achievement of 
development objectives and to the effectiveness of development assistance’ (EuropeAid 
Cooperation Office 2004: 5).’ The handbook distinguished six ‘core concerns’ of good 
governance (EuropeAid Cooperation Office 2004: 8): 
 
 democratisation and elections; 
 promotion and protection of human rights; 
 strengthening of the rule of law; 
 enhancement of the role of civil society; 
 reform of public administration, the civil service and public finance management; 
 decentralisation and capacity building of local government.  
 
EuropeAid argued that such core concerns would all warrant attention in their own right, 
but that attention for proper governance would also need to be ‘mainstreamed’. For this to be 
done, the office formulated six ‘guiding principles’ that should be applied in a ‘horizontal’ 
fashion to ensure that ‘all project and programmes, at every phase of their development, 
promote good governance practices’: participation and ownership, equity, organisational 
adequacy, transparency and accountability, conflict prevention, and anti-corruption 
(EuropeAid Cooperation Office 2004: 9-10). 
 The ‘European Consensus on Development’, adopted by the European Council, 
Parliament and Commission in December 2005, contained a reaffirmation of the EU’s 
orientation to governance: the document emphasised the promotion of governance, 
democracy, human rights and support for economic and institutional reforms among the 
EU’s nine central activities, as it argued the Union had a ‘comparative advantage’ in these 
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areas (European Parliament, Council and Commission 2006: C46/11, 13-14).2 In this particular 
area,  
 
[t]he Community3 will actively promote a participatory in-country dialogue on 
governance, in areas such as anti-corruption, public sector reform, access to justice and 
reform of the judicial system. … With a view to improved legitimacy and accountability 
of country-driven reforms, the Community will … also support decentralisation and local 
authorities, the strengthening of the role of Parliaments, promote human security of the 
poor, and the strengthening of national processes to ensure free, fair and transparent 
elections. The Community will promote democratic governance principles in relation to 
financial, tax and judicial matters.’ (European Parliament, Council and Commission 2006: 
C46/13-14) 
 
As a follow-up to the European Consensus, the European Commission published a 
communication in which it announced a more ‘incentive-based approach’ to governance in 
the context of its most important development relationship, namely its partnership with the 
group of ACP countries. As part of its so-called ‘Governance Initiative’, the Commission 
introduced a ‘governance incentive tranche’ during the tenth round of the EDF, amounting 
to €2.7 billion, or roughly 12 per cent of the funds made available for the 2008-13 period. The 
funds were distributed as ‘additional financial support to countries adopting or ready to 
commit themselves to a plan that contains ambitious, credible measures and reforms’ 
(European Commission 2006d: 10; European Commission 2009: 3-6). 4 In a similar vein, the 
                                                     
2 The other areas were: trade and regional integration; environment and sustainable management of 
natural resources; infrastructure, communications and transport; water and energy; rural 
development, territorial planning, agriculture and food security; conflict prevention and fragile states; 
human development; and social cohesion and employment (European Parliament, Council and 
Commission 2006: C46/11-15). 
3 This terminology stems from the pre-Lisbon constitutional framework, when development 
cooperation, as per the Treaty of Maastricht, was part of the first ‘pillar’ of the European Union, and 
was regulated by title XX, articles 177-181 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community. 
4 (Molenaers and Nijs 2009, Molenaers and Nijs 2011) have presented critical analyses of the 
implementation of the governance incentive tranche. Also, a review done by the European 
Commission (2009: 9-12) highlights some of the difficulties, in particular regarding the size of the 
incentives involved. According to the Commission (2009: 12), ‘the incentive created by the tranche is 
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ENPI for the 2007-10 period contained €50 million for a ‘governance facility’ (European 
Commission 2008b: 5). Of the three main instruments of EU development assistance, the DCI 
was the only one that did not contain an incentive-oriented mechanism; the DCI only 
expressed the intention of mainstreaming the attention for governance, democracy and 
human rights into various thematic programmes (European Parliament and Council 2006: 
L378/46).  
In order to monitor the state and progress of governance reform in partner countries, and 
allocate funds, the Commission established a ‘governance profile’, consisting of nine 
indicators that should enable the establishment of the ‘level’ and ‘trend’ of the performance 
of aid-recipient countries. The profile contains the following elements: political/democratic 
governance, political governance/rule of law, control of corruption, government 
effectiveness, economic governance, internal and external security, social governance, 
international and regional context, and quality of partnership (European Commission 2006a: 
13-29). 
The latest communication on development policy published by the Commission focused 
on ‘development impact’. This communication reiterated the Commission’s focus on human 
rights, democracy and good governance among the EU’s ‘policy priorities’ (European 
Commission 2011: 4-5), while emphasising that EU aid should be directed towards those 
countries with the greatest need for development assistance and countries where aid could 
have the biggest impact, such as fragile states. The communication also stressed ‘incentives 
for results-oriented reform’, for instance by introducing a clearer link to country performance 
with regard to its institutional reforms and policies and by suggesting a connection between 
the allocation of general budget support and a country’s governance situation (European 
Commission 2011: 5, 9-10). 
Arguably in recognition of the fact that democratisation and the protection of human 
rights are not well taken care of by partner governments in the developing world, the EU 
established the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) in 2006. 
The instrument was a follow-up to operations ‘contributing to the general objective of 
developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respecting 
                                                                                                                                                                      
primarily political: encouragement for the partner country to engage in a political dialogue on 
governance and to formalise its political commitment for reform in a “contract”.’ 
9 
 
human rights and fundamental freedoms’, started in 1999 (European Council 1999a, 1999b). 
The EIDHR, with an allocation of €472 million for the three-year period from 2011 to 2013, 
aim to support civil-society organisations in organising education, training and research 
activities in the areas of human rights and democratisation, as well as provide support to 
election observation missions (European Commission 2010b: 5, 10, 36). 
Since the adoption of the European Security Strategy in 2003, fragile states5 have occupied 
a special place in European development policy. The approach to fragile states was a clear 
case of the fusion of the development and security agendas of the European Union 
(European Council 2003a).  State fragility was interpreted, in its operational features, as a 
phenomenon with clear governance overtones. According to the Commission (2007: 8), 
‘[f]ragility is often triggered by governance shortcomings and failures, in form of lack of 
political legitimacy compounded by very limited institutional capacities linked to poverty’. 
In 2007, the European Council requested the Commission to choose a set of pilot countries to 
get experience with the EU response to fragile states. The Commission selected six countries 
(Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Timor-Leste and Yemen), where lessons should 
be learnt for a more comprehensive approach, to be laid down in an Action Plan for Situations 
of Fragility and Conflict (European Commission 2010). To date, the preparation of the action 
plan has not proceeded as expected, as the newly created European External Action Service 
and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy appear to 
have had little direct interest in taking forward the fragile states approach (Castillejo 2011: 
169). 
Since the turn of the century, the European Union has been adopting comprehensive 
‘strategic frameworks’ for the traditional arenas of its development policy that were outlined 
above (Latin America, Asia, Central Asia and the European Neighbourhood), as well as, in 
                                                     
5 State fragility was defined by the European Council in reference to ‘weak or failing structures and to 
situations where the social contract is broken due to the State’s incapacity or unwillingness to deal 
with its basic functions, meet its obligations and responsibilities regarding the rule of law, protection 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, security and safety of its population, poverty reduction, 
service delivery, the transparent and equitable management of resources and access to power’ 
(European Council 2007b: 2). 
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the case of the ACP, specific sub-regions within the grouping.6 Without exception, these 
documents include statements on the promotion of good governance, usually in the context 
of democratisation, the protection of human rights and strengthening of the rule of law. In 
many cases, regionally specific elements are included in the concept of good governance, 
thereby illustrating the elasticity of the term. The most comprehensive notion of governance 
is represented in the Africa-EU partnership document of 2007, which, apart from the 
conventional elements, mentions aspects such as gender equality, the management of natural 
resources, human security and corporate social responsibility (European Council 2007a: 8). 
Other dimensions brought under the rubric of good governance include (European 
Commission 2001a: 18; 2005: 8; 2006b: 6, 25; 2006c: 6-10; 2008a: 3, 10; European Commission 
and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2011: 6, 11; European 
Council 2007c: 20, 23; 2010: 20; European External Action Service 2011: 7): 
 
 the strengthening of civil society (Asia, the Caribbean, the Pacific Islands and the 
Mediterranean); 
 taxation and fiscal policy making (Latin America, the Caribbean and the Pacific 
Islands); 
 forestry management (Central Asia and the Pacific Islands); 
 post-conflict reconstruction and conflict resolution (the Pacific Islands and the Sahel); 
 economic reforms (the Mediterranean); 
 the energy sector (Central Asia) 
 financial management (Latin America); 
 fisheries policy (the Pacific Islands); and 
 water governance (Central Asia). 
 
 
3. Theoretical Approaches and Hypotheses 
Explanations for patterns in development assistance policies have traditionally hovered 
between two poles, usually characterised using McKinlay and Little’s classical dichotomy of 
                                                     
6 The latter approach has led some commentators to talk about a ‘regionalisation’ of the EU’s approach 
to the ACP group (van Seters and Klavert 2011: 14).  
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the recipient need and the donor interest models. Many studies performed since the end of 
the 1970s, including those done by McKinlay and Little, have reported findings pointing at 
the prevalence of foreign policy interests in the explanation of development aid relationships 
(McKinlay and Little 1979, cf. McKinlay and Little 1978a, McKinlay and Little 1978b). Later 
studies, such as Dollar and Levin (2006) and more recently Clist (2011), have found evidence 
of the influence of recipient needs, but continue to report the influence of donor interests, 
suggesting a much less neat distinction between the two types of motivations. 
 Donor interest models relate development assistance, or foreign aid more generally, to the 
foreign policy objectives of a donor government. In this sense, the model draws on classical 
realist notions of foreign policy making and international politics that see aid as one of the 
instruments of foreign policy. Thus, following the seminal work of realist scholar Hans 
Morgenthau, aid needs to be interpreted as ‘an integral part of the political policies of the 
giving country’ and thus subject to the policy objectives of that country (Morgenthau 1962: 
309, cf. Packenham 1966). Empirical research on aid has tended to include variables on trade 
relations or colonial ties as indicators of donor interest (e.g., Dollar and Levin 2006). 
In their approach to aid giving, recipient need models take a radically different starting 
point as compared to the donor interest approach. Informed by idealist views on 
international politics, models based on recipient need have stressed humanitarian motives 
related to conceptions of international justice and have emphasised that donor countries aim 
to improve the quality of life, in particular of the poor, in developing countries. Poverty 
reduction has generally been taken to be the main response to recipient need, and empirical 
studies have commonly been using gross national income or product per capita as the best 
proxy for the level of poverty (Clist 2011: 1726-8, e.g., Dollar and Levin 2006: 2037). 
 Applied to governance-focused development assistance policies, donor interest and 
recipient need models produce different expectations as to the orientations of donor 
agencies. Given that decisions at the level of the EU are not those of one single actor, but the 
result of more complex decision making structures, in many cases involving the Commission 
and the Council, the impact of donor interests and recipient needs cannot be established as 
straightforward as would seem to be possible in the case of national agencies. Yet, certain 
research hypotheses can be formulated on the basis of some commonly agreed interests 
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expressed at the level of the EU and the member states, as well as on the basis of prevalent 
interpretations of recipient needs. 
 In relation to the EU’s development policy, at least three sets of interests can be seen to 
dominate the discourse regarding the motivations for providing aid. In the first place, as 
analysed in Ravenhill’s classical study on ‘collective clientelism’, the countries of the 
European Community, and later the European Union, have used the benefits provided to the 
ACP countries, concluded at Yaoundé, Lomé and Cotonou, as instruments to maintain their 
influence in the former European colonies (Ravenhill 1985: 324-33). The ACP countries’ 
trading capacities have recently, for instance through the focus on the establishment of 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), received most attention. Secondly, particularly 
since ‘9/11’, security considerations have entered the domain of EU development policies. As 
indicated above, the adoption of the European Security Strategy in 2003 (European Council 
2003a) was a sign that the European Council perceived the danger of state fragility as a 
potential threat to the security interests of the European Union. The reconstruction of state 
capacities and security sector reform are the most important objectives of EU policies. 
Finally, a different type of security considerations has entered the discourse on the EU’s 
relationship to its ‘neighbourhood’. Despite the use of this convivial term in reference to the 
countries on the European rim, the issue of migration has been ‘securitised’ in the context of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy, one of the overt aims of which is to reduce illegal 
immigration into the European Union. The enhancement of the security capacity of 
neighbourhood countries was made into a conditionality for EU support through the 
neighbourhood instrument (Kausch and Youngs 2009: 965-8, cf. Buzan et al. 1998: 23-6). 
Following Crawford’s (2001: 98-101) example, the following three complementary 
hypotheses can be formulated to reflect the EU’s donor interests: 
 
Hypothesis 1: EU assistance for the business sector and regulatory reform will be 
concentrated on the ACP countries. 
Hypothesis 2: EU assistance for security-sector governance and state building will be 
concentrated on fragile states. 
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Hypothesis 3: EU assistance for governance of home security (in particular in support of 
measures aimed at stemming migration flows) will be concentrated on countries in the 
European neighbourhood. 
 
 In contrast with the donor interest explanation of development assistance, the recipient 
need interpretation focuses on the extent to which the poverty level of developing countries 
is reflected in allocation decisions on aid. In reflection of the common assumption that the 
strengthening of governance of the public sector – in particular reflected in the strengthening 
of public administration and public finance management reform – would have a positive 
impact on poverty reduction, the recipient need model would predict that countries with the 
highest levels of poverty are the prime targets of EU governance-related development 
assistance. This expectation is reflected in two different hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 4a: EU assistance for public sector reform will be concentrated on countries in 
Africa. 
Hypothesis 4b: EU assistance for public sector reform will be concentrated on the least-
developed countries. 
 
 The classical entry point into development assistance made up by the dichotomous donor 
interest and recipient need models has been supplemented by other types of explanations in 
more recent research on aid policies. Ideas and normative frameworks, in particular, have 
received ample attention in the scholarly literature on aid. For instance, Lancaster (2007: 18-
19) ranged ideas, next to institutions, interests and organisations, among the central domestic 
political influences on aid giving. According to her, ‘worldviews’ (‘widely shared values 
[based on culture, religion, ideology] about what is right and wrong, appropriate and 
inappropriate in public and private life’) and ‘principled beliefs’ or ‘norms’ (‘collective 
expectations about the proper behavior for a given identity’) are important factors in the 
shaping of and decision making on foreign aid (Lancaster 2007: 18). Given the normative 
orientation of the governance agenda, the focus on ideas seems to be highly relevant for the 
possible explanation of aid flows in this domain. 
14 
 
 In the context of EU development assistance, two important, and contradicting, 
interpretations of the impact of ideas and normative frameworks can be distinguished. The 
first interpretation, which could be labelled as ‘liberal’, focuses on the desire to promote 
democracy, human rights and good governance in the developing world with the help of EU 
aid policies. The underlying ideal is that of a liberal-democratic form of government, where 
the state is mainly an impartial arbiter between contending forces that regulates the struggle 
among interests on the basis of well-defined and protected individual rights (cf. Williams 
2008: 13-14, Youngs 2010: 2-4). The concept of ‘normative power Europe’ was coined as an 
attempt to re-interpret the factors motivating the actions of the European Union (the original 
formulation was Manners 2002, a more recent interpretation is Sicurelli 2010: 13-32). 
According to Manners (2002: 242-3) , the acquis communautaire and the acquis politique contain 
five ‘core norms’ (peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms) and four ‘minor norms’ (social solidarity, anti-discrimination, 
sustainable development and good governance). On this basis, he claims that  
 
not only is the EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly … this predisposes it 
to act in a normative way in world politics. … Thus my presentation of the EU as a 
normative power has an ontological quality to it – that the EU can be conceptualized as a 
changer of norms in the international system; a positivist quantity to it – that the EU acts 
to change norms in the international system; and a normative quality to it – that the EU 
should act to extend its norms into the international system. (Manners 2002: 252) 
 
The second, more ‘radical’, interpretation emphasises that the use of development 
assistance for bringing about public sector reform, creating property rights and liberalising 
and opening up the economy is part of a neo-liberal (‘Post-Washington Consensus’) agenda 
that aims at reorganising, and limiting the role of, the state in the economy of developing 
countries. This radical interpretation (Williams 2008: 88-9, e.g., Craig and Porter 2005: 95-121, 
Hout and Robison 2009: 2-5, Hout 2007) has analysed the emphasis on good governance over 
the past fifteen years as a reflection of a more fundamental desire to bringing about market-
oriented social transformation. Key instruments are seen to be the limiting of the role of the 
state (by liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation of the economy) and the establishment 
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and protection of property rights as the main way of supporting citizens’ participation in the 
market. Instead of seeing the normative orientation to political reform in developing 
countries as a sign of moral conviction – demonstrated among others in Manners’ 
interpretation of normative power Europe – the radical position does not take the official 
policy at face value. Rather, in the words of a recent analysis, it provides ‘a critical 
assessment of how norms can work to rationalise policy agendas which tangibly fall short of 
their nominal ethical objectives’ (Langan 2012: 249). In the same vein, Chandler (2010) has 
analysed the EU’s purposes in its relationship with various countries in Southeastern 
Europe, which aspire EU membership, as a situation of ‘post-liberal governance’. He argued 
that the EU has imposed conditionalities on the states of the Balkans in order to ‘reproduce’ 
itself in the region (Chandler 2010: 80). Similarly, two analysts of the current attention for 
state building have claimed recently that this approach is intimately linked to development 
and that it can be interpreted as ‘the repackaging of a long-term agenda for entrenching 
neoliberalism as the organising principle of developing economies and polities and the 
furthering of a putative “liberal peace”’ (Marquette and Beswick 2011: 1705). 
The liberal and radical positions relating to the application of ideas and normative 
frameworks in EU development assistance policies can be translated into the following two 
rivalling hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 5: EU assistance for governance reform will be concentrated on countries that 
have introduced or strengthened liberal democracy, respect for human rights and good 
governance. 
Hypothesis 6: EU assistance for governance reform will be concentrated on countries that 
have adopted or deepened market-oriented policies. 
 
 
4. Methodology and Data 
The analysis of this paper focuses on one of the three key instruments that the EU has 
available in its ‘tool box for external action’, namely assistance, conditionality and political 
dialogue. This paper relates to the financial assistance provided to 126 countries (see 
Appendices A and B), ranging from middle-income to least developed, that qualify for 
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support under the EU’s three main instruments: the European Development Fund (the ACP 
countries), the Development Cooperation Instrument (countries in Latin America, Asia and 
the Middle East) and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (the 
countries on Europe’s southern, eastern and southeastern rim).7 
 Data on EU assistance were obtained from the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) and/or the  
Multi-annual or National Indicative Programme (MIP or NIP) agreed between the European 
Commission and its partner governments. The analysis focuses on the allocations made for 
the period from 2007 to 2013. The reason for opting for an analysis of allocations rather than 
disbursements is that most scholars focusing on assistance agree that the former are 
generally a better approximation of donor intentions than realised payments, since various 
causes may lead to differences between allocations and actual disbursements. 
 Unclarity or vagueness in the Multi-annual or National Indicative Programmes about 
programme categories implied that, in some cases, additional assumptions needed to be 
made on the allocation of budgets to specific governance activities. In those cases where the 
MIP/NIP mentioned only broad governance categories without specifying the allocations to 
those targeted categories in more detail, allocations were assumed to be spread equally over 
the categories mentioned in the MIP/NIP. For the purpose of the current analyses, data on 
allocations to governance programmes were classified into seven categories of support of, 
respectively, human rights activities; public sector and public administration reform; 
decentralisation and local governance; public finance management; judicial reform and 
support to the justice sector; civil society and non-state actors; and elections and formal 
political institutions.  
 The first three hypotheses were tested using one single dependent variable: the aid 
allocations for improving the business environment (hypothesis 1); allocations to the security 
sector (hypothesis 2); and allocations for border control and migration policies (hypothesis 
3). For the testing of the other three hypotheses, factor scores were calculated for three 
composite variables. Support of public sector reform, which was used in the analysis of the 
fourth hypothesis, is the composite of the allocations for public administration reform, 
                                                     
7 The analysis excludes seven countries for which no Country Strategy Paper or Multi-annual or 
National Indicative Programme was available: Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Guinea, Russia, South Sudan, 
Sudan and Zimbabwe. 
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decentralisation and local governance, public finance management and judicial reform. 
Political governance support, used for the testing of the fifth hypothesis, consists of three 
variables: support of human rights activities, support of civil society and support of elections 
and formal political institutions. Support of economic governance, which was applied in the 
testing of the sixth hypothesis, is made up of two variables: aid for the business environment 
and regulatory reform, and aid for regional cooperation. Details of the factor analyses are 
given in Appendix A. 
Following previous analyses of aid selectivity (e.g., Neumayer 2003; Hout 2007; Clist 
2011), a two-stage model is used to determine the impact of a set of explanatory variables on 
aid eligibility (the first stage) and the level of aid allocations (the second stage). The two 
stages reflect the analytical distinction between two types of decisions regarding the 
allocation of aid: which countries are selected for aid programmes and which are not 
(eligibility stage) and how much aid is allocated to countries that are considered eligible 
(level stage)? Aid eligibility is measured as a binary variable for the various categories of aid 
mentioned above. Aid level is measured as the absolute amount of aid for governance reform 
allocated to recipient countries. Because of the skewed distribution of aid allocation, 
logarithmic transformation was applied to the dependent variables expressing the level of 
aid. 
 The explanatory variables are expressed by a range of indicators. Data on these indicators 
have been included for 2007, if available. Appendix A lists the sources of the data, which 
relate to: 
 Income or poverty level, measured as GDP per capita in purchasing power parity, and 
expressed in constant prices of 2005;  
 EU economic interest, measured as the value of exports in millions of euros; 
 Country size, measured as the size of the population in millions; 
 State fragility, as measured by the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index 2007. The index 
includes 114 out of EU’s 126 partner developing countries (with missing data mainly 
concerning smaller [island] states). A higher score on the index reflects that a country 
has more characteristics of state fragility.  
 Least Developed Country status, as reported in UNCTAD’s Least Developed Countries 
Report 2007. The criteria for inclusion among the least developed countries are: low 
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income (three-year average gross national income per capita below $900), limited 
human assets (measured with indicators on nutrition, health, school enrolment and 
literacy) and economic vulnerability (measured with indicators of natural shocks, trade 
shocks, exposure to shocks, economic smallness and economic remoteness). 
 Liberal democracy, calculated by Freedom House as the average score on the political 
rights and civil liberties index, where 1 is the most free and 7 is the least free. 
 Market-oriented reform, as measured by the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators. This dataset includes an indicator of regulatory quality for 2007, capturing 
‘perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development’. 
Gwartney et al.’s 2011 Economic Freedom Dataset contains an alternative indicator of 
market-oriented reform in its ‘summary index of economic freedom’. The latter 
variable is available for far fewer countries than the indicator for regulatory quality 
from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. The correlation between the two indicators is 
.73 (significant at 0.01 level), which indicates that the index of economic freedom can 
serve as a useful validation of the results obtained with the indicator for regulatory 
quality. 
In order to correct the skewed distribution of the data on income/poverty level, EU economic 
interest and country size, these three variables were entered into the analyses after 
logarithmic transformation. 
 The eligibility and level stages are analysed by performing two variants of regression 
analysis, based on the measurement levels of the dependent variables. The analysis of the 
eligibility stage is performed with logistic regression, while for the level stage ordinary least-
squares regression is applied. The analyses of the level stage include only recipient countries, 
that is, countries that have been included as aid partners at the eligibility stage.  
 
 
5. Analysis of EU Allocation Patterns 
This section reports on the findings of the analysis of allocation patterns, in particular to 
governance instruments, that can be witnessed in EU external assistance policies in the 2007-
13 period. The next sub-sections report on the hypotheses that were formulated in section 3. 
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5.1 Support of the Business Sector and Regulatory Reform in ACP Countries 
The results in table 1 relate to the first hypothesis, which concerns one of the aspects of EU 
donor interests. Given the role that ACP countries take in vis-à-vis the European Union, it 
was expected that support of the business sector and regulatory reform would be 
concentrated on this group of aid recipients. The tests of the eligibility and level stages 
indicate, however, that this type of aid was allocated less to ACP than to non-ACP countries: 
column 2 in table 2 indicates a strongly negative and significant impact of ACP membership 
on the eligibility for business-oriented support.8 Although income per capita is not 
significant in equation (2), its positive coefficient indicates that countries with higher 
incomes were important targets for support of the business sector and regulatory reform.9 
Countries with more authoritarian political systems tend, on the whole, to be represented 
better among recipients of this type of aid.10  
 
Table 1 Aid for the business sector and regulatory reform 
 Eligibility stage  Level stage 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
ACP membership  –.808 –.959**  –.264 –.261* 
Income per capita (log) .472 .442  –.552 –.556*** 
EU economic interest (log) –.168   .479** .459*** 
Population size (log) .231   –.023  
Liberal democracy .297* .226*  –.017 .004 
Market orientation .409   –.103  
Constant –2.956 –3.102  2.058* 2.065** 
      
N 118 119  51 51 
Correctly classified (per cent) 60.2 64.7    
R2 .15 .14  .40 .42 
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2  
     (p-value) 
17.599** 
(.024) 
7.186 
(.517) 
   
F value    6.481*** 9.961*** 
 Notes:  Variables in columns 2 and 4 have been removed because of high multicollinearity (r>.40). 
   Reported R2 is Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 at eligibility stage, and adjusted R2 at level stage. 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. P-values are given in brackets for the Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 test. 
 
                                                     
8 The Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 test related to equation (1) is significant, which indicates that the model 
represented in column 1 does not fit the data sufficiently well. 
9 This impact is confirmed if ACP membership is replaced by an interaction term of ACP membership 
and income per capita: in that case the interaction term has a significantly negative impact on aid, 
indicating that richer non-ACP countries tend to be favoured over poorer ACP countries.  
10 Inclusion of a first-order interaction term of ACP membership and liberal democracy did not 
indicate a significant effect in equation (2). 
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 Equations related to the level stage – indicating the relative allocations to measures aimed 
at stimulating the business environment – show that the level of allocations are also 
negatively impacted by ACP membership. Further, it is clear that countries with lower per 
capita incomes receive more, and that trade relations with the EU are a very important 
determinant of the level of aid for the business sector and regulatory reform.11 The impact of 
liberal democracy appears to be negligible at the level stage. 
 The main conclusion from this test is that, although the first hypothesis is rejected, there 
are several variables that impact aid for the business sector and regulatory reform. The 
influence of the liberal democracy variable at the eligibility stage points at the seeming 
absence of ideational considerations, since countries with a liberal-democratic regime tend to 
receive less aid than more authoritarian countries. The actual level of aid allocations in this 
sector show, however, a balance between donor interests and recipient needs. Aid for 
business and regulatory reform is influenced clearly by per capita income in recipient 
countries alongside trade interests of the European Union, in the sense that poorer countries 
and important trade partners of the EU receive significantly more of this type of assistance. 
 
5.2 Security in Fragile States 
Estimates in table 2 concern the second hypothesis, relating to EU aid for security-sector 
governance and state building. It was hypothesised that this type of assistance would reflect 
EU security interests and would hence be directed primarily at fragile states, since the 
potential problems deriving from fragility had been defined as a potential security threat in 
the European Security Strategy of 2003. 
 The results that are summarised in table 2 indicate that the state fragility variable does 
indeed have a significantly positive effect on the choice of countries that the EU has selected 
for security-related assistance. This implies that fragile states tend, on the whole, to be 
favoured for aid to the security sector and state building. At the same time, equation (6) 
                                                     
11 Inclusion of first-order interaction terms of ACP membership, income per capita and EU economic 
interest did not produce a significant change to equation (4). 
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suggests that important trade partners of the EU also tend to be included for this type of aid, 
although the effect of this variable is not significant.12 
 At the level of aid allocation for security-sector governance and state building, effects 
differ quite considerably from those related to aid eligibility, as is demonstrated by equation 
(8). State fragility appears to have a negligible effect on the decision affecting the amount of 
aid in this category. Allocation is mainly effected by political regime and country size, in the 
sense that more liberal-democratic partners and more populous countries tend to receive a 
higher allocation of assistance for security-sector governance and state building. The 
introduction of an interaction term in equation (9) demonstrates that more populous liberal 
democracies, in particular, are the target of aid in this domain. Trade relations appear to 
have an overall negative impact on aid allocation, signalling that security-related assistance 
is mainly flowing to countries where economic interests of the EU are less pronounced.13 
 
Table 2 Aid for security-sector governance and state building 
 Eligibility stage  Level stage 
 (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
State fragility .119*** .086***  .010   
Income per capita (log) .168   .720*   
EU economic interest (log) .535 .568  –.230 –.228 –.280** 
Population size (log) –.054 –.153  .378** .441*** .857*** 
Liberal democracy –.283   –.221** –.114* –.028 
Market orientation .510   –.427*   
Population size*liberal 
democracy 
     –.128** 
Constant –11.883*** –9.901***  –1.073 2.001*** 1.969*** 
       
N 111 113  24 26 26 
Correctly classified (per cent) 82.9 83.2     
R2 .25 .22  .28 .20 .34 
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 
     (p-value) 
3.507 
(.899) 
11.373 
(.181) 
    
F value    2.465* 3.116** 4.165** 
 Notes:  Variables in columns 6 and 8 have been removed because of high multicollinearity (r>.40). 
   Reported R2 is Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 at eligibility stage, and adjusted R2 at level stage. 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. P-values are given in brackets for the Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 test. 
 
                                                     
12 Inclusion of a first-order interaction term of state fragility and EU economic interest did not lead to a 
significant alteration of equation (6). 
13 These results are not changed significantly by the introduction of a first-order interaction term of EU 
economic interest and liberal democracy, nor of EU economic interest and population size. 
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The main conclusions that can be drawn on the basis of the analyses presented in table 2 
are that quite different logics appear to be at play at the eligibility and level stages 
concerning EU aid allocations for security-sector governance and state building. The second 
hypothesis, regarding the impact of state fragility on security-related assistance given by the 
EU, is clearly corroborated at the eligibility stage. Given the selection of partners at the 
eligibility stage, the distribution of aid funds over those partners appears to have been 
determined primarily by the nature of the political regime (liberal democracy) and the 
relative importance of the country, expressed by the size of the population. In particular, 
larger, more liberal democratic countries seem to have been the target of security-oriented 
aid. Trade relations with the EU appear not to have been an overriding concern in allocating 
this type of aid. The most important conclusion of this section is that, where donor interests 
seem to play a crucial role at the stage of the selection of recipients, more ideational 
considerations, related to the nature of the political regime, appear to have dominated the 
actual distribution of aid over the selected recipients.   
 
5.3 Homeland Security and Migration in the European Neighbourhood 
The third hypothesis, related to the provision of EU aid for home security governance 
(particularly aimed at migration flows), is analysed in the equations presented in table 3. The 
basis of the hypothesis was that the EU is concerned about migration flows stemming in 
particular from Northern Africa and from countries on its eastern border. The protection of 
borders in countries in the European neighbourhood would, for this reason, be a priority in 
the EU’s aid for enhancing homeland security governance.  
 The results summarised in equation (11) in table 3 indicate that membership of the 
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument is the prime predictor for being 
selected by the European Union as a recipient of aid in the domain of homeland security and 
migration. Next to ENPI membership, all other variables have non-significant coefficients, 
although the negative impact of per capita income and the positive effect of EU economic 
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interest is in line with some of the effects that were reported above and that follow from the 
combination of donor-interest and recipient-need influences on EU aid policy.14 
 At the level stage, ENPI membership appears to be the single most important explanatory 
variable for aid on homeland security and migration: 54 per cent of the variance in the 
dependent variable is explained by the predictors in equation (13). Of the 10 countries that 
have been receiving assistance under this instrument, four were part of ENPI. They appeared 
to have received much more significant allocations of aid for the purpose of stemming 
migration flows than other countries.  
 
Table 3 Aid for governance of homeland security and migration 
 Eligibility stage  Level stage 
 (10) (11)  (12) (13) 
ENPI membership 1.515 2.092**  2.049* .654*** 
Income per capita (log) –2.352* –1.611  –8.443  
EU economic interest (log) 1.573 .642  3.845  
Population size (log) –1.011   –.789  
Liberal democracy –.102 –.225  1.392  
Market orientation .132   1.931 .144 
Constant 3.771 1.747  13.427* .611*** 
      
N 118 119  10 10 
Correctly classified (per cent) 91.5 91.6    
R2 .19 .17  .71 .54 
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2  
     (p-value) 
10.431 
(.236) 
13.005 
(.112) 
   
F value    4.582 6.331** 
 Notes:  Variables in columns 11 and 13 have been removed because of high multicollinearity (r>.40). 
   Reported R2 is Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 at eligibility stage, and adjusted R2 at level stage. 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. P-values are given in brackets for the Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 test. 
 
 The analyses reported in this section do clearly lend support to the hypothesis on the 
considerations for governance assistance in the fields of homeland security and migration. In 
this domain, aid can clearly be seen to stem from the self-interest of the European Union, 
which is aimed at restricting the inflow of people from bordering countries into its territory. 
 
  
                                                     
14 Various first-order interaction terms of ENPI membership (with per capita income, EU economic 
interests and liberal democracy) were included, but appeared to have no significant impact on 
equation (11). 
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5.4 Public Sector Reform in Africa and the Least Developed Countries 
Table 4 provides an overview of the outcomes of the analyses on the fourth hypothesis, 
which concerns the allocation of support to the public sector in EU partner countries. The 
hypothesis was that the paradigm shift in development assistance concerning governance 
and the public sector would have impacted EU development assistance and would have led 
to a redirection of such aid to the countries most in need of it. Thus, two variants of the 
hypothesis – one focused on countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and the other related to least 
developed countries – was formulated. 
 The results in the first four equations in table 4 suggest that three variables play a key role 
at the eligibility stage: development level (measured by variables on sub-Saharan Africa and 
least developed country status), liberal democracy and EU economic interest.15 Of these, 
development level clearly has the strongest impact on the choice to include developing 
countries for EU support to the public sector. Yet, also liberal democracy and EU economic 
interest exert influence on aid eligibility in this domain: countries selected for assistance to 
public sector reform tend, on the whole, to have less democratic political systems and be 
more important for the EU in terms of trade opportunities. Thus, the hypothesis is partly 
corroborated, in the sense that recipient needs play an important role in the selection for this 
type of assistance, but is also qualified because of the apparent impact of EU interests and 
attention to non-democratic regimes. 
 At the level stage, represented by equations (18) to (21), the explanation of public sector 
support is dominated by a smaller number of variables. Equation (19) shows that the location 
in sub-Saharan Africa has a negative impact on the level of allocations for public sector 
reform, although the coefficient for this variable is not significant. Replacement by other 
indicators of development level (least developed country status and income per capita) in 
equation (21) shows that per capita income has a strong and highly significant impact on the 
allocation, signalling that poorer developing countries receive more EU support for public 
sector reform than relatively richer ones. As at the eligibility stage, EU economic interests are 
also highly important as explanation for the aid allocation in this domain: more important 
trade partners receive more public sector assistance than less important ones. The 
                                                     
15 None of the first-order interactions among least developed country status, EU economic interest and 
liberal democracy appeared to have significant impact in equations (15) and (17). 
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standardised regression coefficient indicates that economic interest is twice as important as 
predictor of public sector support than per capita income. This result indicates that the 
hypothesis that recipient needs, as operationalised by level of development, impact aid 
allocations, is seriously qualified: although development level is shown to have an impact on 
the allocation of public sector aid, its impact is greatly influenced by EU economic interests.16 
 The conclusion with regard to the fourth hypothesis is that there is evidence that recipient 
needs do play a role in EU aid allocations on public sector reform, and tend to be an 
important consideration particularly at the eligibility stage. Results described in this section 
show, however, that such a conclusion needs to be immediately qualified, because donor 
interests have a serious impact as well. These interests have some influence on decisions 
which countries receive EU development assistance in this sector, but are particularly strong 
when exact allocations of such support are determined. The evidence presented seems to 
indicate that aid allocations benefit primarily two groups of developing countries: these are 
the poorer countries, on the one hand, and the richer developing countries where the EU has 
significant trade interests, on the other. 
 
5.5 Aid for Political Governance Reform 
The results of the analysis of hypothesis 5 are summarised in table 5. Together with the sixth 
hypothesis, which is discussed in the next section, this hypothesis focuses on the impact of 
ideas and normative frameworks on aid policies adopted by the EU. Hypothesis 5, in 
particular, attempts to assess the impact of what is referred to as ‘normative power Europe’. 
The tests reported in table 5 measure to what extent allocation decisions on support for 
political governance programmes (aimed at human rights activities, civil society and 
electoral processes and formal political institutions) can be explained with reference to the 
character of the political system of aid-recipient developing countries, particularly in the 
areas of civil  rights and political liberties. 
 
                                                     
16 Inclusion of an interaction term of per capita income and EU interests shows that this has a strong 
impact and replaces the effect of the two separate variables, but leads to a serious reduction of the R2 
value of the equation. This finding illustrates that the effect of per capita income and EU interests are 
mutually reinforcing, in that EU trade interests are very strong particularly in developing countries 
with higher levels of income. 
26 
 
Table 4 Aid for public sector reform 
 Eligibility stage  Level stage 
 (14) (15) (16) (17)  (18) (19) (20) (21) 
Sub-Saharan African country 1.320* 2.210***    –.569** –.118   
Least Developed Country   .333 1.946***    .173  
Income per capita (log) –3.692***  –4.424***   –1.138**  –.452 –.571** 
EU economic interest (log) 1.815*** .224 2.219*** .587**  .704*** .506*** .591** .663*** 
Population size (log) –1.565**  –1.941***   –.102  .096  
Liberal democracy .268 .414*** .234 .311**  .048 .059 .061 .025 
Market orientation –.637  –.661   .225  .205  
Constant 8.717** –2.214*** 10.871** –2.835***  2.778* –1.026** .143* .546 
          
N 118 124 118 124  75 75 75 75 
Correctly classified (per cent) 78.0 76.6 76.3 74.2      
R2 .50 .37 .47 .31  .24 .17 .20 .22 
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2  
     (p-value) 
6.362 
(.607) 
8.814 
(.358) 
6.636 
(.576) 
3.787 
(.876) 
     
F value      4.977*** 5.969*** 3.985*** 7.851*** 
 Notes:  Variables in columns 15, 17, 19 and 21 have been removed because of high multicollinearity (r>.40). 
   Reported R2 is Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 at eligibility stage, and adjusted R2 at level stage. 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. P-values are given in brackets for the Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 test. 
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The equations on the eligibility stage reported in table 5 show that decisions on aid for 
political governance seems to have been determined, first and foremost, by the relationship 
of developing countries to the EU under its main partnership instruments: ACP and ENPI. 
The findings show a positive relationship of membership of ACP and ENPI, as well as of 
location in sub-Saharan Africa, on the inclusion in aid frameworks for political governance.17 
The coefficient of the liberal democracy indicator appears to be positive – which indicates 
that less democratic countries had a greater likelihood of being selected than more 
democratic ones – but is not significant. This finding casts serious doubt on approaches that 
point at the importance of normative factors when explaining the selection for aid 
programmes aimed at political governance. 
 
Table 5 Liberal democracies and aid for political governance  
 Eligibility stage  Level stage 
 (21) (22)  (23) (24) 
ACP membership 1.386*   .056  
Sub-Saharan African country .363 1.917***  .351 .510** 
ENPI membership 1.748** 1.336*  1.197*** .656* 
Income per capita (log) –2.007*   –.186  
EU economic interest (log) .001 –.182  –.114 .570*** 
Population size (log) .088   .825***  
Liberal democracy .213 .144  –.005 .064 
Market orientation .764   .344  
Constant 6.116* 2.913**  .552 –1.603*** 
      
N 120 124  74 75 
Correctly classified (per cent) 72.9 69.4    
R2 .31 .24  .50 .36 
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2  
     (p-value) 
5.605 
(.691) 
5.366 
(.718) 
   
F value    10.213*** 11.370*** 
 Notes:  Variables in columns 22 and 24 have been removed because of high multicollinearity (r>.40). 
   Reported R2 is Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 at eligibility stage, and adjusted R2 at level stage. 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. P-values are given in brackets for the Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 test. 
 
At the level stage, explanations on assistance for political governance prove to be once 
more different from those pertaining at the eligibility stage. Equation (24) shows that the 
                                                     
17 The multicollinearity between ACP membership, on the one hand, and sub-Saharan African country 
and ENPI membership, on the other, appeared to be relatively high. The equation with ACP 
membership instead of the other two groupings is not reported because the Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 
statistic indicated that the model fit was insufficient. First-order interaction effects are not reported 
because those involving the four variables in equation (22) proved all to be not significant. 
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allocation of support for political governance is explained first and foremost by different 
factors than the normatively inspired level of liberal democracy in EU partner countries. 
Countries in sub-Saharan African and members of the European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument receive considerably more in aid for political governance than 
developing countries outside these frameworks. In addition to these factors, EU economic 
interests do again appear to have an overriding influence on aid allocations: the standardised 
effect of trade relations appears to be double that of the two other main explanatory 
variables.18 
The conclusion on the fifth hypothesis, related to aid for political governance, is that 
decisions on this variety of aid programmes tends to be influenced primarily by political and 
economic interests instead of normative considerations. The favouritism vis-à-vis the its 
main collaboration partners in the developing world seems to reflect the EU’s age-old bias 
towards particular groups of partners, described as ‘collective clientelism’ by Ravenhill 
(1985). This type of political considerations, which appears to work both in decision-making 
on the selection of development partners and on the allocation of specific volumes of aid, is 
reinforced by economic interest calculations at the level stage. Thus, instead of being 
‘normative power Europe’, in the case of assistance to political governance ‘economically 
interested Europe’ seems to be the main driving force for decisions on aid. 
 
5.6 Aid for Market-oriented Governance Reform  
The main findings related to the sixth hypothesis, concerning more ‘radical’ interpretations 
on EU development assistance, are summarised below in table 6. This hypothesis was 
formulated in relation to views that understand the use of development assistance as part of 
a neo-liberal agenda, which aims to deepen markets and lock in pro-market reforms in 
developing countries. The model tested in the equations reported in table 6 focus on the 
extent to which aid for economic governance (related to the business environment, 
regulatory reform and regional cooperation) can be understood as a ‘reward’ of the market-
oriented reforms that had been implemented by EU development partners. 
                                                     
18 Interaction effects were included between EU economic interests, sub-Saharan African country and 
ENPI membership, but were not significant. 
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 The findings reported in table 6 on the eligibility for economic governance assistance 
indicate that the overall strength of the explanation is rather limited, as the R2 value of 
equations (25) and (26) hovers around .10. Equation (26) shows that only ENPI membership 
has a significant impact on the choice of countries for this type of support from the European 
Union. Although market-oriented reform in developing countries has a positive impact in 
the selection process, the value of its coefficient is not significant.19 The results therefore cast 
doubt on the hypothesis that neo-liberal policy preferences have impacted the selection 
process for economic governance assistance in a significant way. 
 
Table 6 Market-oriented regimes and aid for economic governance  
 Eligibility stage  Level stage 
 (25) (26)  (27) (28) 
ACP membership –1.268   .234  
Sub-Saharan African country 1.227 .656  –.432 .030 
ENPI membership .963 1.483**  1.168*** 1.416*** 
Income per capita (log) –.279   –.630  
EU economic interest (log) –.226   .485  
Population size (log) .082   .134 .529*** 
Liberal democracy .098   –.013  
Market orientation .538 .255  –.122 –.008 
Constant 1.933 2.122  1.189 –.126 
      
N 118 124  70 70 
Correctly classified (per cent) 63.6 58.9    
R2 .11 .07  .44 .45 
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2  
     (p-value) 
1.630 
(.990) 
9.631 
(.292) 
   
F value    7.767*** 14.903*** 
 Notes:  Variables in columns 26 and 28 have been removed because of high multicollinearity (r>.40). 
   Reported R2 is Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 at eligibility stage, and adjusted R2 at level stage. 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. P-values are given in brackets for the Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 test. 
 
 Results pertaining to the level stage show slightly better statistical results than those on 
the eligibility stage, as reflected in the last two columns of table 6. The results indicate that 
ENPI membership and population size are the only significant predictors of the level of 
economic governance support. These results indicate that considerations of political and 
economic interest may be at play in the allocation of funds to strengthen markets and 
enhance regional (trade) cooperation, since countries in the ENPI framework are an obvious 
                                                     
19 When entered in equation (26) the first-order interaction terms of sub-Saharan African country, 
ENPI membership and market orientation did not have a significant coefficient. 
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strategic focus for EU policies.20 The low to very low values of the coefficient for market 
orientation indicates that neo-liberal policy frameworks cannot be used to account for the 
allocation of this type of assistance to developing countries. 
 The conclusion of the analyses reported in this section is that the impact of neo-liberal 
policy preferences, operationalised by an indicator on regulatory reform, on EU aid for 
economic governance seems to have been almost negligible. As was the case in the previous 
section, on aid for political governance reform, findings suggest that political and economic 
interests may have been at play in policies in this area. The strategic importance of the 
‘neighbourhood’ to the European Union can be understood as a crucial factor in the EU’s 
decisions to allocate aid monies to programmes that aim to strengthen markets, both at the 
national and the regional level in the ENPI area. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has attempted to provide an interpretation of the ‘governance turn’ that is 
witnessed in the development policies adopted by the European Union during the first 
decade of this century, more in particularly since the adoption of the ‘European Consensus 
on Development’. Governance reform, captured in the notion of ‘good governance’ was 
shown to be an important element in the EU’s policies on poverty reduction across the 
developing world. 
 The discussion of the evolution of notions of good governance and development at the 
level of the European Union demonstrated that the quality of governance in countries was 
seen to be a vital (co-)determinant of development outcomes. Governance, according to a 
handbook published by the EuropeAid Cooperation Office in 2004, relates to at least six main 
dimensions: democratisation and elections, human rights, the rule of law, the role of civil 
society, public sector reform and public finance management, and decentralisation and local 
government. In relation to the assumed impact of good or bad governance on development 
processes, the EU felt that the allocation of a substantial part of its development budget 
would be warranted to foster positive change in developing countries. 
                                                     
20 The first-order interaction of market orientation with the other predictors did not provide significant 
results. 
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 The focus of this paper has not been on the level of policy formulation, but rather on the 
allocation of funds through the EU’s main policy instruments: the European Development 
Fund for countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, the European Neighbourhood 
Partnership and Instrument for countries on the southern, eastern and southeastern ‘rim’ of 
the European Union, and the Development Cooperation Instrument for countries in Latin 
America, Asia and the Middle East. The central research question of the paper was whether 
any dominant explanation, or combination of explanations, provided in the literature on 
development assistance, would be able to account for the distribution of over €50 billion in 
assistance provided by the European Commission over the 2007-13 period. Three sets of 
explanations have been placed centrally: donor interest models, recipient need 
interpretations and constructivist explanations focusing on ideas and norms. 
 The empirical analysis in the second half of the paper involved a quantitative test of six 
hypotheses derived from the three central explanations. Three hypotheses related to donor 
interest models posited that EU funds would be allocated to economic governance in the 
ACP countries, security-sector governance and state building in fragile states, and home 
security in and the curbing of migration flows from countries in the ‘neighbourhood’. Two 
hypotheses, derived from recipient need models, made a link between the allocation of EU 
funds and poverty levels in partner countries. Two final hypotheses, linking to constructivist 
notions on the impact of ideas and worldviews, related allocation patterns to the desire to, 
respectively, further the spread of liberal democracy and the deepening of market-oriented 
development. 
 The empirical analyses reported in this paper lead to the conclusion that European aid in 
the 2007-13 period seems to have been dominated by economic and political interests, with 
some additional influence stemming from recipient needs. The impact of ideas and 
normative considerations appears to have been either very weak or outright negligible. 
Donor interests have been the red thread running through all the different aid modalities 
implemented by the European Union in the period under analysis. These interests seem to 
have taken different forms in different programmes. Economic interests, operationalised as 
trade relations between the EU and developing countries, have been found to be associated 
with allocation decisions (the level stage) on business sector support, aid for public sector 
reform and political governance. The EU’s donor interests have played out in other ways in 
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different programmes: fragile states were found to be the focus of support for security sector 
assistance, while aid for homeland security and economic governance programmes were 
concentrated on members of the ENPI. 
It would be one-sided, however, if the account of EU aid programmes were limited to a 
discussion of donor interests. Considerations of recipient needs do also appear clearly in EU 
development assistance frameworks, although they often seem to take a back seat to 
economic and political interests. Analyses show that per capita income, least developed 
country states and location in sub-Saharan Africa played a role in explanations of business-
sector support, aid for public-sector reform and political governance programme, but always 
in conjunction with donor interest variables. 
Finally, the variables that were used to test the impact of ideas and normative frameworks 
on the selection of countries for aid programmes and the specific allocation patterns, did not 
lend much support to constructivist explanations of EU aid allocation. Indicators of liberal 
democracy and market-oriented reform played only a marginal role in the explanations of 
EU development assistance. 
The current paper set out to analyse whether explanatory models of development 
assistance, formulated primarily for application to bilateral donors, would work in the 
context of EU aid. This paper seems to demonstrate that similar logics can be applied to the 
EU as to other donors. More work needs to be done, particularly for analysing the impact of 
ideas and normative frameworks on EU aid. 
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Appendix A: Countries and data 
 
Countries in the analysis 
The analyses in the paper include all countries (1) with a relationship with the European 
Union under one of the three development-related instruments: the European Development 
Fund (EDF), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and the European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) for the 2007-13 period, and (2) with a 
Country Strategy Paper. 
The following 126 countries met the criteria and were included in the analyses: 
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, The 
Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Chile, People’s Republic of China, Colombia, the Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Republic of Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, 
Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, 
Nauru, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, The Philippines, Rwanda, Samoa, São Tomé e Principe, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and The Grenadines, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Uganda, 
Ukraine, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia. 
 
Aid data 
Data on the allocations of EU aid to recipient countries were obtained from CSPs and 
MIPs/NIPs for the countries mentioned above, through the website of the DG Development 
and Cooperation–EuropeAid (European Commission 2012d) or the European External 
Action Service (2012). 
 
Other data: definitions and sources 
ACP group membership: Source: European Commission (2012a and 2012b).  
ENPI membership: Source: European Commission (2012c). 
DCI group: Source: European Commission (2012d). 
State fragility: Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index 2007. Source: Fund for Peace (2007). 
Income/poverty level: GDP per capita in purchasing power parity, 2007, constant prices (2005 
international dollars). Source: World Bank (2012), series NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD. 
Country size: Population in millions. Source: World Bank (2012), series SP.POP.TOTL. 
EU economic interest: EU27 exports in millions of euros (2007). Source: Eurostat (2012). 
Least Developed Country status: Source: UNCTAD (2007: iii).  
Liberal democracy: The average score on the political rights and civil liberties index for 2007. 
Source: Freedom House (2012). 
Market-oriented reform: Indicator for regulatory quality for 2007. Source: World Bank (2011). 
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Factor analyses 
 
Support of governance reform 
 Factor loading 
Support of public administration reform .760 
Support of decentralisation and local governance .742 
Support of public finance management .653 
Support of judicial reform .851 
Eigenvalue 2.279 (57.0%) 
 
Political governance support 
 Factor loading 
Support of human rights activities .612 
Support of civil society .730 
Support of elections and formal political institutions .755 
Eigenvalue 1.479 (49.3%) 
 
Support of economic governance 
 Factor loading 
Support of the business environment and regulatory reform .770 
Support of regional cooperation .770 
Eigenvalue 1.185 (59.3%) 
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Appendix B: EU aid allocations under 10th EDF, ENPI or DCI, 2007-13 
 2007-10 2011-13 2007/8-13 Total 
Afghanistan 610.0 600.0  1210.0 
Algeria 220.0 172.0  392.0 
Angola   214.0 214.0 
Antigua and Barbuda   3.4 3.4 
Argentina   65.0 65.0 
Armenia 98.4 157.3  255.7 
Azerbaijan 92.0 122.5  214.5 
Bahamas   4.7 4.7 
Bangladesh 205.0 198.0  403.0 
Barbados        0.2 0.2 
Belarus       – 56.7  56.7 
Belize          11.8 11.8 
Benin           334.0 334.0 
Bhutan        8.0 6.0  14.0 
Bolivia       134.0 115.0  249.0 
Botswana        73.0 73.0 
Brazil        39.65 21.35  61.0 
Burkina Faso    529.0 529.0 
Burundi         188.0 188.0 
Cambodia        152.0 152.0 
Cameroon        239.0 239.0 
Cape Verde      51.0 51.0 
Central African Republic   137.0 137.0 
Chad            299.0 299.0 
Chile           41.0 41.0 
China         128.0   128.0 
Colombia      104.0 59.0  163.0 
Comoros         45.0 45.0 
Congo, Democratic Republic   514.0 514.0 
Congo, Republic   85.0 85.0 
Cook Islands    3.0 3.0 
Costa Rica      34.0 34.0 
Cuba          – 20.0  20.0 
Djibouti        40.5 40.5 
Dominica        5.7 5.7 
Dominican Republic   179.0 179.0 
Ecuador       75.0 66.0  141.0 
Egypt         558.0 449.3  1,007.3 
El Salvador   72.6 48.4  121.0 
Eritrea         122.0 122.0 
Ethiopia        644.0 644.0 
Gabon           49.0 49.0 
Gambia          76.0 76.0 
Georgia       120.4 180.3  300.7 
Ghana           367.0 367.0 
Grenada         6.0 6.0 
Guatemala     87.9 47.1  135.0 
Guinea-Bissau   100.0 100.0 
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Guyana          51.0 51.0 
Haiti           291.0 291.0 
Honduras      127.5 95.5  223.0 
India         260.0 210.0  470.0 
Indonesia     248.0 200.0  448.0 
Iraq          65,8 58.7  124,5 
Israel        8.0 6.0  14.0 
Ivory Coast     218.0 218.0 
Jamaica         110.0 110.0 
Jordan        265.0 223.0  488.0 
Kenya           383.0 383.0 
Kiribati        12.7 12.7 
Laos          33.0 36.0  69.0 
Lebanon       187.0 150.0  337.0 
Lesotho         136.0 136.0 
Liberia         150.0 150.0 
Libya          60.0  60.0 
Madagascar      577.0 577.0 
Malawi          436.0 436.0 
Malaysia        17.0 17.0 
Maldives      4.0 6.0  10.0 
Mali            533.0 533.0 
Marshall Islands   5.3 5.3 
Mauritania      156.0 156.0 
Mauritius       51.0 51.0 
Mexico          55.0 55.0 
Micronesia      8.3 8.3 
Moldova       209.7 273.1  482.8 
Mongolia      14.0 15.0  29.0 
Morocco       654.0 580.5  1,234.5 
Mozambique      622.0 622.0 
Myanmar       65.0 33.0  98.0 
Namibia         103.0 103.0 
Nauru           2.7 2.7 
Nepal         60.0 60.0  120.0 
Nicaragua     114.4 99.6  214.0 
Niger           458.0 458.0 
Nigeria         677.0 677.0 
Niue            3.0 3.0 
Pakistan      200.0 198.0  398.0 
Palau           2.9 2.9 
Panama        14.5 23.5  38.0 
Papua New Guinea     130.0 130.0 
Paraguay      64.0 53.0  117.0 
Peru          85.8 49.2  135.0 
Philippines   61.0 69.0  130.0 
Rwanda          290.0 290.0 
Samoa           30.0 30.0 
São Tomé e Principe   17.1 17.1 
Senegal         288.0 288.0 
Seychelles      5.9 5.9 
42 
 
Sierra Leone    242.0 242.0 
Solomon Islands   13.2 13.2 
Somalia         212.0 212.0 
South Africa    980.0 980.0 
Sri Lanka     52.0 60.021  112.0 
St Kitts and Nevis   4.5 4.5 
St Lucia        8.1 8.1 
St Vincent and The Grenadines   7.8 7.8 
Suriname        19.8 19.8 
Swaziland       63.0 63.0 
Syria         130.0 129.0  259.0 
Tanzania        555.0 555.0 
Thailand      8.0 9.0  17.0 
Timor-Leste     63.0 63.0 
Togo            123.0 123.0 
Tonga           5.9 5.9 
Trinidad and Tobago   25.5 25.5 
Tunisia       300.0 240.0  540.0 
Tuvalu          5.0 5.0 
Uganda          439.0 439.0 
Ukraine       494.0 470.0  964.0 
Uruguay         31.0 31.0 
Vanuatu         21.6 21.6 
Venezuela       40.0 40.0 
Vietnam       160.0 144.0  304.0 
Yemen         60.0 –22  60.0 
Zambia          475.0 475.0 
 
                                                     
21 The 2011-13 period has not been considered for Sri Lanka, as no Multiannual Indicative Programme 
seemed to be available for the period beyond 2010. 
22 The 2011-13 period has not been considered for Yemen, as no Multiannual Indicative Programme 
seemed to be available for the period beyond 2010. 
